This means that the ECJ did not follow the same methodology as the CFI, which attempted to resolve the matter on the basis of international law itself. Due to this difference in approach, the validity of the CFI's arguments pertaining to international law have not been formally refuted. This applies in particular to the CFI's reasoning on whether the Security Council violated (peremptory) obligations of international law. As a result, it remains unclear whether a decision to grant the affected individuals access to an independent tribunal at the EU level (and on the basis of EU law) would result in a violation of binding Security Council resolutions. If this were the case, it would trigger the international responsibility of the respective member states, which could lead to countermeasures by the Security Council.
The answer to the question of whether state responsibility could be triggered in this fashion would, in turn, depend on whether the Security Council itself acted in accordance with international law when requiring states to implement sanctions in a manner that effectively suspends the right to a fair trial of those affected by the sanctions regime. According to the CFI's reasoning, the Security Council acted in accordance with international law when suspending this right. This reasoning -which was not addressed at all by the ECJ -has subsequently been adopted by domestic courts in Switzerland 21 and the United Kingdom. 22 These examples of the potential spill over effect of the reasoning of domestic and regional courts further underline the importance of analysing the reasoning of the CFI.
This chapter challenges the CFI's reasoning on the basis of the legal framework outlined above in Section I(a). What follows will focus on three questions of public international law which were of central importance to the CFI's decision. The first concerns the relationship between the primacy rule in article 103 of the Charter and the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as peremptory norms of international law.
The second relates to the competence of the courts of the European Communities under international law to review Security Council decisions, while the third concerns the implications of the right to a fair trail for the Security Council. Although the right to a fair hearing was not the only fundamental right affected by (domestic implementation of)
Resolution 1267 (1999) and subsequent resolutions, it was arguably the most deeply affected. In addition, it constitutes a procedural prerequisite for the effective enforcement of all other fundamental rights that were affected by the sanctions regime. As a result, it ought to have a prominent place in the subsequent analysis. Following this discussion, the author will draw some general conclusions from the case law in order to illustrate the (role of domestic courts in the) development of a hierarchy of norms within international law itself. 46 If the right to property itself has not acquired jus cogens status, it seems unconvincing to argue that the arbitrary deprivation of the right to property has done so.
Similarly, the immunity enjoyed by the United Nations, as specified in article 105(1) of the Charter, 47 does not belong to the corpus of jus cogens norms. The article was intended to protect the organisation against direct action in domestic (or regional)
courts, which must be distinguished from the case at hand, which concerns the incidental review of a binding decision taken by an organ of the United Nations. 48 In essence therefore, the CFI's analysis of the human rights obligations binding on the Security
Council is both under and over inclusive. It is under inclusive insofar as the CFI reduces the purposes and principles of the Charter to jus cogens obligations. However, by simultaneously attaching jus cogens status to obligations which are not recognised as such in state practice, the CFI's analysis is over inclusive.
B. Judicial Review of (the Application of) Security Council Decisions
Insufficient reasoning also plagues the CFI's conclusion that it would not have the right to review incidentally binding Security Council resolutions. 49 First, the CFI failed to explain if and to what extent the existing practice of the CFI and ECJ in this regard, as well as those of other (international) courts and tribunals, would be relevant to its decision. Second, it failed to explain why an exception to its 'non-competence' would exist in relation to peremptory norms of international law. At this point it is necessary to mention that similar deficits plague the reasoning of the ECJ. Although its decision turned on EU law, the ECJ did note in rather categorical terms that the Community judicature did not have the jurisdiction to review incidentally the lawfulness of a decision adopted by an international body. Moreover, the ECJ was unwilling to accept that any obligations is concerned. 54 The fact that the neither the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) nor the respective domestic courts were explicitly set up with the purpose to review different sets of international obligations against one another, has not prevented them from developing this competence in practice. Less common and more controversial is the incidental review of Security Council obligations by domestic and regional courts.
This review is complicated by the fact that the courts are not necessarily confronted solely with the balancing of different treaty obligations pertaining to the same state. They can also be called upon to determine the legality of the acts of an international organisation, which is itself a product of one of the treaties in question.
Recent practice of the Community judicature indicates that one can identify three situations of incidental review of Security Council resolutions. In the first scenario, the ECJ had to interpret the scope of the EU's implementation measures, and incidentally that of the relevant Security Council resolutions. However, in this situation neither the legality of the measures nor that of the Security Council resolutions were questioned. In the second scenario, the ECJ was confronted with challenges to the legality of the implementing measures, but could avoid an incidental review of the legality of the respective Security Council measures. In this instance the Security Council measures were formulated in broad terms, as a result of which those responsible for their implementation had discretion as to how to achieve the desired result. The third scenario concerned disputes about the legality of measures of implementation which incidentally also touched on the legality of the respective Security Council resolutions. This was the case where the relevant Security Council resolutions were formulated in narrow terms which did not prima facie allow the member states (or the EU) any discretion in relation to their implementation. As far as the first two scenarios are concerned, the ECJ has not hesitated to exercise its competence in the past, even though such review was not one has to acknowledge that the Community judicature is not in any way bound to these decisions. What is more, the nature of the ICJ and the ICTY is very different from that of CFI and ECJ. Whereas the two former courts are international institutions, the CFI and ECJ, given their centralised nature, arguably bear more resemblance to municipal courts.
Even so, one should keep in mind that all of these institutions are independent judicial bodies, none of whose statutes explicitly provide for the competence to review the legality of Security Council resolutions.. A coherent and systematic approach to international law would have required the CFI and ECJ to explain whether this fact has any bearing on their own competence and if so (or if not), why (not). Moreover, if one accepted that no power of review existed, one would also have expected an explanation as to why an exception would exist in relation to jus cogens norms. In this instance the ECJ was more consistent than the CFI, since it rejected the CFI's submission that an exception existed in relation to peremptory norms of international law.
C. The Right to a Fair Hearing

The Content of a Right to a Fair Hearing
As indicated in Section I, the human right that was arguably restricted most severely by the implementing measures pertaining to Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions, is that of the right to a fair trial. The substance of this right (of which the core content is binding for the United Nations), 72 is defined in article 14 (1) There is sufficient similarity in the wording of article 6(1) ECHR and article 14 (1) ICCPR to apply the decision by analogy in the present context. 75 The relevance is increased by the fact that the case relates to precautionary measures adopted in order to prevent terrorism, as is the case with the Al-Qaeda sanctions regime. 
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The majority of the House of Lords did not accept that the (cumulative effect of) the control order constituted a criminal charge, as there was no assertion of criminal conduct but merely a foundation of suspicion. In addition, the purpose of the order was 73 Elsewhere this author has answered this question in the affirmative in light of the punitive nature, severity, as well as the stigmatisation resulting from the sanctions, see De Wet and Nollkaemper, above n 1, 177.
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Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2007] UKHL 46 (Control Orders decision).
75
The relevant sentence of art 14(1) ICCPR, see above n 42, reads as follows: 'All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' The relevant sentence of art 6(1) ECHR, see above n 53, reads as follows: 'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. preventative, and not punitive or retributive. 79 The House of Lords confirmed that the proceedings fell within the civil limb of article 6(1) ECHR; 80 moreover, it explicitly relativised the difference between the criminal and civil limb of that article by emphasizing the need for procedural protection commensurate with the gravity of the potential consequences -regardless of whether one is dealing with the criminal or civil dimension of article 6(1).
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Acknowledging the severe nature of the control orders at stake, the House of Lords further described the right to be heard in judicial proceedings as being of essential importance. It underlined that whilst the right was not absolute, it contained a core, irreducible and non-derogable minimum. 82 In the present circumstances this core content was undermined, as the affected individuals were effectively confronted by a bare, unsubstantiated assertion which they could only deny. The justifiability of the control orders depended exclusively on closed (inaccessible) materials, which could not be effectively challenged by the controlled persons. The situation was therefore distinguishable from cases where the thrust of the case was conveyed to the controlled person by a summary of statements which have been made anonymous.
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In essence therefore, the House of Lords confirmed that the ability to effectively challenge allegations of involvement in terrorism constitutes an irreducible minimum of the right to a fair trail, regardless of whether one is dealing with a civil suit or criminal charge. 84 If one applies this reasoning analogously to article 14(1) ICCPR, a similar core content of the right to a fair hearing would constitute an outer limit for Security Council action. Consequently, Security Council resolutions authorizing the freezing of individual assets as a preventative measure against terrorism have to provide for some form of independent and impartial ex post facto judicial review that enables the affected individuals to be informed about the gist of the case against them. An unsubstantiated assertion supported by inaccessible evidence would not meet this criterion. acknowledges the right of states to exercise diplomatic protection, it does not oblige them to do so. 90 In this context one has to note that subsequent to the Yusuf and Kadi decisions, the CFI decided that EU law obliges the EU member states to exercise such diplomatic protection in relation to blacklisted individuals in their territory. 91 However, this does not alter the fact that this avenue of diplomatic protection does not amount to even-handed, independent and impartial judicial protection.
First, the affected individuals have no access to the information upon which their inclusion in the sanctions list was based, as it is in the discretion of the state requesting the listing whether such information has to be made public. 92 The listed individuals therefore do not have access to the thrust of the case against them. The Sanctions
Committee also reaches its decisions by means of political consensus, as a result of which the objection of one member can prevent the removal from the list. 93 In addition, the Committee effectively reviews its own decision; the same members who initially suspected individuals of involvement in international terrorism consider the accuracy of that judgment. 94 Where the Sanctions Committee refuses to de-list individuals, the result is that they remain blacklisted for an indefinite period of time as there is no sunset clause attached to the blacklisting procedure. 95 In order to introduce a sunset clause, a new
Chapter VII resolution would be necessary which could, in turn, be prevented by a veto from one of the permanent members.
In light of these considerations, it is unconvincing for the CFI to claim that the Guidelines guarantee an effective de-listing procedure and that rights of individuals are only affected for a limited period of time. 96 Similarly, the submission that the Guidelines 
III. ASESSMENT IN LIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
In light of the above analysis one can conclude that the reasoning of the CFI in the Yusuf and Kadi decisions is convoluted and unconvincing. However, this has not prevented these decisions from significantly influencing the approach of other courts in the region towards the emerging hierarchy of norms in international law and the role of domestic courts in enforcing such a hierarchy. At first glance, the Yusuf and Kadi decisions have strengthened the notion of a hierarchy in international law by imposing outer limit on Security Council action (compliance with Jus Cogens norms). They have also confirmed (a limited) role for domestic and regional courts in enforcing this hierarchy. Moreover, the uncertainties resulting from the Kadi jurisprudence may be a necessary element in the dialogue that is developing between domestic and regional courts, as well as these courts and (international) political organs in an era where the infringement of human rights increasingly originates from within international organisations. In time, this dialogue may result in more underlying consensus between the different actors, less differences in interpretation and better protection of individual human rights by international organisations. After all, much of the current confusion could be removed if the Security Council itself had sufficient political will to provide for an effective judicial review mechanism at the level of the United Nations, and in accordance with the human rights standards developed by the organisation itself. 111 In such a situation, domestic and regional courts would be much less inclined to engage in stringent judicial review of Security Council decisions, and the risk of contradictory interpretations would be significantly reduced.
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This position was supported by Advocate General Poiares Maduro, above n 20, [54] and also alluded to in the Kadi decision (ECJ), above n 14, [322] .
